FURTHER THOUGHTS ON TAX TREATMENT OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
by Robert W. Wood
To the Editor
I read with interest the report by the New York State Bar Association
Taxation Section on the deductibility of punitive damages (Tax Notes, Nov.
26, 2001, p. 1209). As is predictable with reports by that body, I found
it thorough and helpful. It provides a useful analysis of the pros and
cons. I found a couple of points worth underscoring.
First, in “The Case for Nondeductibility” (p. 1213), the report notes
that supporters for the nondeductibility proposal mention various Code
provisions that attempt to impose social policy. Golden parachutes, greenmail,
and excessive employee compensation are mentioned, but my guess is the
list is much longer than this. To me, the argument that other Code provisions
do the same type of thing that nondeductibility for punitive damages would
do begs the question. The real question (as the Report suggests) is whether
nondeductibility would have additional deterrent effects, and how this
fundamental change would be received by juries that impose punitive damages
and by the businesses that must pay them. I am not an economist, but I
found the Report’s recitation of economic views on punitive damages to
be quite important. And, I fully subscribe to the notion that if punitive
damages are made nondeductible, there must be a fundamental change in the
information provided to juries so they take into account the after-tax
effects of the punitives.
The only omission I can find in the Report that might provide a helpful
analogy is the tax treatment of anti-trust payments. Two-thirds of a payment
in that context may be treated as nondeductible (where there are related
criminal proceedings leading to a conviction or nolo plea). However, this
has been the law (in Section 162(g)) for many years, and I do not believe
there is substantial confusion about it. Without thorough economic analysis
and empirical data, I don’t think the nondeductibility proposal for punitive
damages should be seriously considered.
Fundamental character questions may undermine any attempt to draw
bright lines. As the Report suggests, punitive damages awarded in a variety
of types of cases may be premised on various theories, one of which is
the potential inadequacy of compensatory damages where it may be too difficult
or too costly to measure those damages accurately (Tax Notes, p. 1215).
This invites a kind of impossible inquiry: Just why were the punitive damages
awarded? To me, this portion of the New York report is most persuasive.
We already have enormous characterization problems on the income
side (a topic not discussed in the Report). It is now clear that punitive
damages always constitute income to the recipient. The IRS now commonly
engages in a recharacterization battle to attempt to import punitive characterization
to settlements (for example, in cases settling on appeal), where oftentimes
it is not clear that punitives have been paid. Indeed, in some cases the
IRS attempts to attribute punitive treatment to settlements before trial
merely because punitives were requested! Adding to such characterization
problems on the deduction side would be a huge mistake.
Very truly yours,
Robert W. Wood
Further Thoughts on Tax Treatment
of Punitive Damages, Tax Notes (December 10, 2001), p. 1502.